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The Euro Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Diego Valiante 
he intergovernmental agreement reached in 
December among 25 EU countries – the so-
called ‘fiscal compact’ – aims at levelling the 
playing field among member states' public finances in 
the euro area to promote greater institutional 
interaction and ease the current debt crisis. In 
addition, the European Stability Mechanism would 
also provide a potential means of coordination of 
fiscal policies in the eurozone. Political decisions so 
far, however, have not effectively tackled this crisis. 
A non-cooperative equilibrium 
The eurozone debt crisis has fallen into a classic 
prisoner's dilemma. One party does not cooperate 
because it would expose itself to the potential non-
cooperative decision of the other party, the latter of 
which would be able to extract a greater payoff than 
the cooperative solution would yield in the short-term. 
In other words, weaker countries, if they decide to 
give away part of their sovereignty to a supranational 
institution, would expose themselves to the imposition 
of supervisory and governance mechanisms in favour 
of creditor countries. The recent proposal by an 
influential member of the Bundestag to place Greek 
public finances under the direct control of a European 
Commissioner was not made in jest.  
Countries with better public finances, instead, would 
expose themselves to the moral hazard of debtor 
countries that, once protected by the solidarity 
mechanisms of the federal institution, would have 
insufficient incentive to carry out structural reforms 
and austerity measures. As a consequence, so far few 
member states have shown any real interest in 
transferring additional sovereignty to a more federal 
and politically united governance of the eurozone. 
Fear of losing control over the political decisions 
taken by the euro area is triggering a series of rational 
(but sub-optimal1) choices incapable of dealing with 
the core issues of the crisis and so leading to an 
outcome/equilibrium that no one really wants (and 
everyone will regret ex post), i.e. the total or partial 
break-up of the euro area. 
The roots of the dispute 
Two key issues emerge from this crisis. First, it is 
essential to rebalance the competitiveness among the 
member countries of the eurozone. To avoid austerity 
measures becoming self-defeating, less competitive 
countries should be assisted in their attempt to boost 
growth and development through additional 
investments in productivity and support to structural 
reforms. This is a long-term and costly action, 
however, that can only be achieved secondly by 
empowering European institutions to redistribute a 
bigger EU budget with part of the surpluses that some 
countries are steadily enjoying over time. This in turn 
will require fundamental reform of the current 
European institutions, which does not appear high on 
EU leaders’ agenda.  
While it is unquestionable that peripheral countries 
were myopic in postponing structural reforms when 
refinancing costs were at their lowest levels, it is true 
as well that the monetary union has largely helped 
more competitive countries by freezing exchange 
rates at that time. An implicit currency devaluation in 
more productive countries occurred, as that decision 
blocked the dynamic evolution of exchange rates, 
which typically adjust over time to reflect the ever-
changing economic and political realities of a country 
                                                     
1 A leaked document by the Financial Times, prepared by 
the Commission, ECB and IMF, casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of current Greek debt deal of €130 billion, 
even though the deal opens new scenarios for a systematic 
debt restructuring of eurozone member states’ debt (see 
http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2012/02/more-on-leaked-
greek-debt-report/#axzz1mwwHvkIm). 
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(IMF, 2003). The common currency has therefore 
widened the original divergences in competitiveness. 
For instance, since 2002, Germany has enjoyed on 
average a current account surplus of roughly 5%.2 The 
German economy thus has been able to reinvest (at 
current GDP levels) almost €100 billion a year, which 
has fuelled additional investments in productivity and 
growth. The gap between member countries with 
different levels of competitiveness has been widening 
with the common currency.3 
The second key aspect is the absence of an effective 
emergency liquidity mechanism to seal the eurozone 
off from further contagion effects coming from the 
Greek debt restructuring. If the ECB is not allowed to 
carry out a direct intervention (in primary or 
secondary markets) or an indirect one through 
standing facilities (the ESM and EFSF) or to continue 
with the LTROs,4 financial markets will certainly test 
the limited resources available through the funds 
(currently up to €500 billion) and thereby the 
effectiveness of the implicit guarantees posted by 
member states (see Valiante, 2011). Markets are 
already discounting that, due to tough economic and 
financial conditions, some countries will not be able 
to generate sufficient cash flow to repay their debt. 
The recent ECB intervention (LTRO) to inject 
liquidity in the banking system is just a temporary 
solution to tap a continuous problem on the asset side. 
Inching towards the optimal equilibrium  
A sequence of sub-optimal, non-cooperative equilibria 
condemns any agreement that would entail a transfer 
of sovereignty to supranational institutions to fail. 
However, it is not in the member states' interest to let 
the euro area go. Therefore, when a new crisis looms 
over EU financial markets, the payoffs of the non-
cooperative behaviour drop, as countries perceive the 
risks of the alternative option if they do not find an 
agreement. In the end, even though fundamental 
institutional decisions are gradually taken, decisions 
come at a very slow pace and therefore at high 
implementation costs for member countries. Overall, 
the ‘game' moves towards the optimal equilibrium, 
but it moves on a sequence of sub-optimal solutions, 
which are costing the eurozone a lot in terms of 
worsening financial and economic conditions (lower 
growth) and rising social conflict. 
                                                     
2 Just before the introduction of the euro, Germany went 
through important reforms, e.g. labour market reforms, but 
this does not entirely justify the sharp evolution of its 
current account surplus. 
3 For instance, Spain has implemented some important 
reforms in the labour market, as well as promoted huge 
investments in infrastructure and development, but the 
country has lost competitiveness in any event and has only 
partially succeeded to boost productivity. 
4 Long-Term Refinancing Operations. 
The real question is: what will the final optimal 
equilibrium will look like? Firstly, it is crucial to set 
up the proper institutional framework that would 
allow member states to interact on the same playing 
field. Secondly, increasing the firepower to backstop 
widespread liquidity crises across the eurozone would 
create a stable safety net. Whether this will be done 
through the ECB's indirect intervention (through 
support to banks and current funds) or through a 
direct one (via a classical quantitative easing), it will 
be a political decision. As a matter of fact, the euro 
area will need to seal off from further contagion 
effects the debt of countries such as Italy and France. 
Once this is done, a parallel process of debt 
restructuring (using collective action clauses 
introduced in national laws) and the swap of parts of 
national debts with Eurobonds or Eurozone-
guaranteed bonds would provide solid grounds for 
growth measures to thrive on a solid ground. Europe 
should be able to combine debt restructuring 
(deleveraging) and growth. The process will be 
certainly long and painful, but it will strengthen the 
common market and the political and economic role 
of the euro area in the global economy. A long-term 
cooperative equilibrium among member states would 
make sure that all citizens will not feel caught as 
prisoners of the eurozone and its unresolved dilemma. 
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